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ABSTRACT 
Belarus is a country with a commonly misunderstood foreign policy, which cannot be 
grasped by the classic bandwagoning-balancing dichotomy. The paper argues that under 
the conditions of deeply embedded geostrategic asymmetries and with a view to by-
passing structural restrictions of its foreign policy, Belarus pursues strategic hedging, in 
particular in its relations with Russia. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Belarus is a country with a foreign policy widely misunderstood by external actors, 
both in the West and in the East. A quarter century after it gained national 
sovereignty, Minsk is still struggling with shaping its own foreign policy narrative 
and getting it across to partners around the world. Normally, external actors 
interpret Belarus’s foreign policy actions either through the lenses of their own 
narratives or by applying dichotomous academic concepts, such as band-
wagoning and balancing. However, these concepts and others’ narratives are 
mostly exogenous to the thinking inside the Belarusian government. They only 
distort the understanding of the rationale, objectives, possibilities, and limitations 
on the ground and, thus, further complicate it for Belarus to pursue strategic 
goals and national interests in international relations. 
Besides being a problem and challenge for Minsk, this established misunder-
standing inhibits external actors’ ability to interpret Belarus’s behaviour in foreign 
affairs and correctly identify the limits of the possible in dealing with Belarus. 
Against the backdrop of the present-day geopolitical tensions in and around 
Eastern Europe, the problem looks particularly relevant. 
Officially, Belarus has always declared multi-vectored foreign policy as its con-
ceptual cornerstone (like the majority of other post-Soviet states). However, in 
reality the country finds itself amid tough geostrategic asymmetries that turn the 
idea of a balanced multi-vectored policy into a figure of speech rather than a 
practical strategy. Its heavy multi-level dependence on Russia pre-programmes 
and structurally restricts its manoeuvring space. However, even a shallow obser-
vation of Belarus’s foreign policy behaviour suggests that Minsk does not restrict 
itself to what conventional theoretical approaches would expect. 
This paper argues that under the conditions of deeply embedded geostrategic 
asymmetries and with a view to bypassing structural restrictions of its foreign 
policy, Belarus pursues strategic hedging. In particular, Minsk chooses to hedge in 
order to minimise its political and economic risks in relations with Russia, shape 
Moscow’s options and decisions, and broaden its strategic manoeuvrability (which, 
as Dong (2015) argues, are typical objectives of a hedging state in international 
relations). In this, Belarus’s thinking and decision-making is structured by the logic 
of a small state in international relations. 
In what follows, the paper first conceptualises the small state in international 
relations. It then discusses conventional ideas about small states’ foreign policy 
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behaviour and looks separately at strategic hedging as a distinctive strategic 
option in foreign policy. The final section examines Belarus’s policy towards Russia, 
primarily in the context of the Ukraine crisis. 
 
 
SMALL STATE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
The starting point of the discussion about the small state in International Relations 
is its definition and conceptual relation to other types of states. Most often, IR 
theory operates three relative concepts to deal with states’ size and influence – 
great, middle and small powers/states. The literature has no universally accepted 
definition of a small state. Moreover, the line between small and medium states is 
often blurred and depends on the context. In certain contexts, as Baehr observed 
(1975: 466), even the otherwise explicit dichotomy between a small and a large 
state does not look sharp, for example, when they both face a global hegemonic 
superpower. 
As most of the literature emerged during the Cold War and in the context of 
systemic confrontation between hegemonic superpowers, it is not surprising that 
security-based definitions of small states were used widely. For example, according 
to Rothstein (1968: 29): 
‘A Small Power is a state which recognises that it can not obtain security 
primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally 
on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so; 
the Small Power’s belief in its inability to rely on its own means must also be 
recognised by the other states involved in international politics’. 
However, this and similar definitions fail to pass the ‘sharpness test’ as they need 
additional explanations attuned to every case under consideration. Therefore, some 
scholars prefer quantifiable measurements of state smallness. For example, Prasad 
(2009: 44) names four key indicators: population size, GDP, land area, and level of 
trade. Vital (1967: 8–9) was among the first to suggest ‘a frankly subjective, if not 
arbitrary’ quantitative threshold for countries to be categorised as small: a popu-
lation of up to 10–15 million in economically developed countries and 20–30 
million in economically non-advanced countries.  
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From a security standpoint, material power capabilities reveal a state’s size more 
than anything else. That is why, besides such proxies as GDP and population 
numbers, the level of military expenditures and other military indicators are often 
taken into account (Wivel et al. 2014: 6). 
Thus, the core question here is whether small states should be ‘categorised 
along geographic, demographic or economic lines’, or whether institutions, re-
sources, and power hold the key’ (Smith et al., 2005). In any way, as Baldacchino 
(2009: 26) points out, small states are always contrasted with big states: 
‘[…] small states are assumed to be price takers in a largely inhospitable 
global market, while big states are deemed more likely to be price makers. 
Small states are deemed to be more vulnerable to such external shocks as 
invasions, externally directed coups and mercenary attacks, unlike larger 
states’. 
Descriptively, most writers agree on the overall behavioural trait of small states in 
IR: they naturally tend to adapt to the external word, rather than to seek domi-
nation over it (Panke, 2010: 15; Wivel et al., 2014: 5–6). It is along these lines that 
Keohane (1969: 295) suggested focusing on states’ systemic role and singled out 
four types of states based on this criterion: ‘system-determining’, ‘system-
influencing’, ‘system-affecting’ and ‘system-ineffectual’. The latter would be a cate-
gory for small states: 
‘[…] some states […] can do little to influence the system-wide forces that 
affect them, except in groups which are so large that each state has minimal 
influence and which may themselves be dominated by larger powers. For 
these “system-ineffectual” states foreign policy is adjustment to reality, not 
rearrangement of it’ (Keohane, 1969: 296). 
Keohane also emphasised the importance of the psychological and perceptional 
dimensions. In other words, how the systemic role of states is seen by their own 
statesmen and diplomats. 
A growing number of scholars prefer to operate interpretative understanding 
of the small state concept. For example, Wivel et al. (2014: 8–9) suggest using it as 
a reference to highlight ‘the characteristic security problems and foreign policy 
dilemmas of the weaker actors in asymmetric power relationships’. In their 
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definition, a small state represents ‘the weaker part in an asymmetric relationship, 
which is unable to change the nature or functioning of the relationship on its 
own’ (Wivel et al., 2014: 9). In accordance with this definition, small states ‘are 
stuck with the power configuration and its institutional expression, no matter 
what their specific relation to it is’ (Mouritzen and Wivel, 2005: 4). 
In this respect, Belarus corresponds to the definition of a small state. An 
asymmetric relationship of structural weakness is clearly observable in Belarus’s 
relations with Russia. A similar, even though less explicit, relationship exists 
between Belarus and the other immediate great power (geopolitical pole) – the 
European Union, where Minsk lacks any effective leverage. 
 
 
SMALL STATE’S FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOUR: HOW NEOREALISM 
AND DOMESTIC-LEVEL THEORIES MISS THE MARK ON BELARUS 
After several decades of initial debates about the meaning of size in IR, neo-
realism opened a new chapter in the scholarship about weak powers. Its idea that 
‘international politics can be thought of as a system with a precisely defined 
structure’ (Waltz, 2008: 74) carried with it serious analytical implications for the 
research on small states. Neorealism’s analytical rigour introduced an ambitious 
theory to understand small states’ behaviour. 
Most importantly, neorealists see small states’ agency as nonessential. In their 
worldview, the specific internal characteristics of a small state and the ideas and 
intentions of its leadership are not central to studying its behaviour in inter-
national affairs. 
The neorealist scholarship discusses two most typical strategies of small states 
when they face a strong and potentially threatening external power: balancing 
against the power or bandwagoning with it. In the former case, a state aims to 
counter-check the external threat either by entering into an alliance with another 
power or group of states (external balancing) or by increasing its own capabilities 
(internal balancing), for example, in the security realm (Waltz, 2010). When 
bandwagoning, a small state opts to ‘crouch under – rather than contain against – 
a fast emerging power’ (Cheng-Chwee, 2008: 160). In other words, a bandwa-
goning state chooses to follow a bigger power’s line of action and stay in a sub-
ordinate role with a view to ensuring security or economic benefits (Schweller, 
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1994). In Walt’s terminology, ‘balancing and bandwagoning are the alliance 
equivalents of deterring and appeasing’ (Walt, 1987 28). 
Levy concludes that ‘weaker states in the proximity of stronger states do what 
is necessary to survive, which often involves bandwagoning with the strong instead 
of balancing against them’ (1989: 231). In some cases, bandwagoning can be seen 
as a way for a small state to acquire ‘voluntary or semi-voluntary shelter from a 
larger state’ (Bailes et al., 2014: 26). Thus, neorealists see bandwagoning as a more 
likely foreign policy outcome of small states. According to Labs (1992: 385), when 
small states are not pressured into becoming part of a great power conflict they 
will actually prefer to stay nonaligned, but if forced to take a side they will in all 
probability bandwagon. Fox (1959: 186–187) suggests that small states generally 
seek neutrality against the background of conflicts between great powers. 
However, given their limited resources and capabilities, they will inevitably tilt 
towards the great power winning in the conflict. 
Walt (1987) discussed a more nuanced context by analyzing the origins and 
logic of interstate alliances. He specifically combined three factors – geographic 
proximity, offensive power and aggressive intentions – with the factor of a state’s 
aggregate power and, based on that, suggested a balance-of-threat framework 
instead of the more abstract balance-of-power one. Like other neorealists, Walt 
sees bandwagoning as the most probable possibility for weak states. He also 
suggests a set of hypotheses on the conditions that favour the choice of balancing 
or bandwagoning: 
1. The stronger the state, the greater its tendency to balance. Weak states will balance 
against other weak states but may bandwagon when threatened by great powers. 
2. The greater the probability of allied support, the greater the tendency to balance. 
When adequate allied support is certain, however, the tendency for free-riding 
and buck-passing increases. 
3. The more unalterably aggressive a state is perceived to be, the greater the 
tendency for others to balance against it. 
4. In wartime, the closer one side is to victory, the greater the tendency for others to 
bandwagon with it (1987: 33). 
 
However, while claiming theoretical rigour, neorealism fails to explain specific 
developments on the ground. Examples most relevant for this paper include the 
Russia-Georgia war of 2008 – the Georgian government’s behaviour before, during 
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and after the war. Whereas, neorealism would unequivocally expect Georgia to 
bandwagon with the increasingly assertive and aggressive Russia, in fact, it 
pursued a form of balancing (both internal and external). Even more revealing 
Belarus-related examples are refusals by Minsk to side with Russia’s policies in 
Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine since 2013 (the annexation of the Crimea and the 
the Donbas crisis), even after Moscow exerted direct pressure on its ally. In both 
cases, as the author’s interviews with high-ranking Belarusian policy-makers imply, 
Moscow demanded that Belarus bandwagon with its decisions: to recognise the 
breakaway entities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, to officially recognise the 
Crimea as part of Russia, and to advance military cooperation with Russia in the 
face of growing geopolitical tensions in Eastern Europe (Anonymous interviews, 
2015–2016). Moreover, Belarus’s reactions to Russian pressure and accompanying 
foreign policy challenges revealed that the other option expected by neorealism – 
balancing – was neither activated. 
Domestic-level theories argue that small states’ agency does matter. These 
theoretical approaches are often coined as Innenpolitik theories because of their 
stress on internal factors as sources of foreign policies. Depending on a specific 
approach’s focus, they prioritise such factors as national culture and mentality, 
ideology, political and socio-economic systems, institutional interactions, party 
competition, and leaders’ perceptions, etc. (Gvalia et al., 2013). Thus, to under-
stand a country’s foreign policy behaviour, primary attention should be paid, they 
argue, ‘inside the black box’ in order to ‘examine the preferences and configu-
rations of key domestic actors’ (Rose, 1998: 148). 
In the words of Cooper and Shaw (2009: 4), ‘small states in the twenty-first 
century cannot be seen simply as structurally weak Lilliputians in a system cont-
rolled by the big and strong’. Vulnerability is replaced by the notion of ‘resilience’ 
as a dominating characteristic of the small state (Briguglio, 2007: 105). Instead of 
just ‘system-takers’, they appear to be fully-fledged actors with a ‘range of activity 
options’ that allow ‘structural factors to be resisted and reshaped’ (Cooper and 
Shaw, 2009: 4). 
However, applying the Innenpolitik logic to the Belarusian case, it is also easy 
to note that it does not provide a satisfactory analytical framework to explain 
Minsk’s foreign policy decisions. While focusing on specific domestic-level factors, 
these theories fail to account for variances in decisions on the same or similar 
foreign policy matters, which are particularly typical of Belarus. Minsk’s line on the 
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Crimean case can again serve as an example. It seems impossible to explain the 
contradictory steps – e.g. voting in Russia’s favour at the UN General Assembly 
and simultaneously making political statements in support of Ukraine’s position. 
The same regular contradictions are observed in relation to the Donbas crisis. 
Also, interviews with Belarusian policy-makers reveal the significance of structural 
factors in shaping their thinking and decision-making (Anonymous interviews, 
2015–2016). 
 
 
NEOCLASSICAL REALISM AND STRATEGIC HEDGING 
Given the various shortcomings of both the domestic-level and neorealist 
approaches in explaining foreign policy choices of small states, and even in 
embracing a satisfactory bundle of factors to be accounted for in an analysis of a 
small state’s external relations, alternative middle-ground theories started to 
enter the scene. Perhaps, the most ambitious and overwhelming such theoretical 
alternative, which aims at overcoming the structure-agency problem, is neo-
classical realism. Unlike several ‘smaller’ theories (such as, for instance, omni-
balancing (David, 1991) or Putnam’s (1988) two-level games theory), it offers a 
sort of grand approach for understanding international relations. The neoclassical 
realist framework started to gain academic weight at the end of the 1990s, when 
Rose (1998) offered the term itself. 
Being part of the realist school of thought, neoclassical relists concur with 
neorealists’ vision of systemic shaping forces in the IR. However, they seek to 
‘explain variation in the foreign policies of the state over time or across different 
states facing similar external constraints’ (Taliaferro, Lobell and Ripsman, 2009: 
17). Thus, neoclassical realism presents an attempt to bridge the structure-agent 
problem, while staying with the broad realist tradition, where they, inter alia, 
agree that size should be seen as a systemic indicator and that it matters. 
Generally, this implies that a country’s foreign policy is not completely and 
narrowly pre-programmed and that deviations from lines of behaviour and stra-
tegies expected by neorealists should not be treated as single exceptions that 
only re-emphasise the rule. On the contrary, neoclassical realists contend, the rule 
is that national elites inevitably make differing choices in similar situations because 
of their own perceptions, ideas, ambitions or even rationally unclear calculations 
and beliefs. Furthermore, elites and concrete political leaders are not always 
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entirely free to use the national capabilities as they see right or beneficial, as 
various country- and situation-specific circumstances dictate all the time certain 
lines of behaviour (Ibid.). This explains why similar decision situations lead to some-
times contrastingly different policy outcomes and why the lack of strict foreign 
policy continuity even under the same national leadership is a logically normal 
phenomenon. 
As Chafer and Cumming (2011: 9) point out, neoclassical realism has mainly 
been used to deal with great/strong powers. However, it does bring a similar level 
of added analytical value to the research on small states, which is increasingly 
reflected in the literature. Olsen (2011: 94), for instance, demonstrates this by 
analysing Scandinavian states’ Africa policies. By using neoclassical realism, his 
study reveals that small states often can find ways to ‘punch above their weight’. 
This can be done by pursing active coalition policies, taking a proactive stance 
and initiative in international organisations and occupying specific niches, such as 
that of a ‘norm entrepreneur’. Yet, the study also concludes that ‘small states only 
temporarily can punch above their weight as they ultimately are bound by their 
relative lack of material and security power’ (ibid.). 
Being a more pluralistic theoretical framework than neorealism or domestic-
level theories, neoclassical realism does not narrow down small states’ foreign 
policy options to just a few strategies. It allows space for a variety of theoretical 
possibilities and actually requires further conceptualisation in order to fill the 
overall grand framework with concrete meaning. 
In the case of Belarus, one promising concept to be used as an organic part of 
the neoclassical set of instruments is strategic hedging. The concept is borrowed 
from the world of finance and is relatively new, even though increasingly popular, 
to the IR literature. Dong defines strategic hedging as: 
[…] an insurance strategy that aims at reducing or minimising risks arising 
from the uncertainties in the system, increasing freedom of manoeuver, 
diversifying strategic options, and shaping the preferences of adversaries. It 
is a portfolio or mixed strategy that consists of both cooperative and 
competitive strategic instruments ranging from engagement and enmesh-
ment, all the way up to balancing. Any hedging portfolio will be a combi-
nation of both cooperative and competitive strategic instruments (2015: 64). 
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Tessman operationalises a similar definition but contextualises it by making a 
reference to systemic conditions that should be conducive to a small state opting 
for a hedging type of foreign policy behaviour. According to him, strategic 
hedging ‘can be identified as part of a coherent long-term plan that is designed 
to maximise opportunities and minimise threats for a second-tier state in a 
unipolar system with a leading state that is clearly in relative decline’ (Tessman, 
2012: 209). As an analytical toolkit, this set of characteristics (a long-term plan, a 
second-tier state, a leading state in relative decline) can be applied on different 
scales. On the global scale, it can be a useful approach to almost any power’s 
relations with the system hegemon (perhaps, in the state of relative decline). On a 
regional or sub-regional level, it can shed light on small states’ strategies towards 
regional powers or it can promote understanding of how countries’ relations with 
the global system leader/leaders shape their regional policies and bilateral 
constellations with neighbours. 
Tessman (2012: 193) also characterises strategic hedging as ‘behaviour that is 
simultaneously less confrontational than traditional balancing, less cooperative 
than bandwagoning, and more proactive than buck-passing’. Given the some-
what abstract nature of such definitions, how can a state’s foreign policy strategy 
be practically identified as an instance of hedging? Tessman argues that a state’s 
line ‘must be intended to develop or expand the means for achieving [identifiable 
military or public goods objectives]’ (ibid.). He presents an identification mecha-
nism which consists of three filters. 
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UNIVERSE OF STATE BEHAVIOUR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BEHAVIOUR IS AN EXAMPLE OF STRATEGIC HEDGING 
 
Figure 1. A Mechanism for Identifying Strategic Hedging Behaviour (Tessman, 2012: 
2010) 
YES 
FILTER THREE 
Is behaviour strategic in the sense that it is developed, funded and 
coordinated at the highest levels of government? Does it involve an issue 
area that has been explicitly recognised as a major national security interest 
by the highest levels of government in the relevant state? 
YES 
FILTER TWO 
Does behaviour avoid direct confrontation of the system leader via the 
formation of an explicit military alliance aimed at the system leader (external 
balancing), or via a significant arms build-up that is meant to challenge the 
system leader (internal balancing)? 
YES 
FILTER ONE 
Does behaviour improve the competitive ability of the actor should it enter 
into a militarised dispute with the system leader? 
OR 
Does behaviour improve the ability of the actor to cope without specific 
public goods or subsidies that are currently being provided to it by the 
system leader? 
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One important implication of this mechanism (in particular, Filter 3) is that 
Tessman invites more systemic and long-term analysis of a country’s foreign 
policy, rather than a focus on separate events and foreign policy choices. 
 
 
BELARUS’S STRATEGIC HEDGING TOWARDS RUSSIA:  
THE UKRAINE CRISIS 
This paper argues that the foreign policy of Belarus, in particular towards Russia, 
in contrast to its popular depiction in international media, can be seen as an 
instance of strategic hedging. Minsk’s behaviour increasingly resembles that of 
small East Asian nations, which, ‘unsure of China’s intentions and reluctant to 
choose sides between Beijing and Washington’, employ hedging strategies 
between the two (Dong, 2015:64). A generally similar logic (of course, with multiple 
differing nuances) is applied to the specific geostrategic asymmetries in which 
Belarus finds itself. 
Since the break-up of the Soviet Union and the inception of the Common-
wealth of Independent States in 1991 Belarus has been an avant-garde partici-
pant of the numerous projects of post-Soviet integration. One of them – the 
Union State of Belarus and Russia – saw the evolution from a loose commonwealth 
to a union state with close cooperation in a number of vital domains, including the 
military realm. 
The very creation of such a union state caused many analysts and diplomats to 
consider Belarus a ‘vassal state’ of Russia (Janeliunas, 2007: 155). However, as the 
last 15 years demonstrated, it could rather be called an ‘awkward ally’ (Trenin, 2005) 
than a ‘vassal’. On numerous occasions, did the authorities in Minsk demonstrate 
that there is a difference between signing union treaties and calling Belarus Russia’s 
brotherly nation, on the one hand, and making foreign policy decisions that are 
not typical of an ally.  
Belarus became particularly interesting for analysis when it opted to join the 
Eurasian integration. Initially, Minsk acceded to the Customs Union (CU) in 2010, 
then the Single Economic Space (SEE) was launched in 2012 and, finally, the 
Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) became reality on 1 January 2015. Importantly, 
the first two stages – the CU and SES – coincided with a protracted crisis in Belarus’s 
relations with the EU. At the time, this fact led many analysts to conclude that 
Belarus finally lost its foreign policy manoeuvrability. In the words of Moshes, 
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The possibility for Minsk to conduct a more balanced foreign policy has been 
eliminated. Even hypothetical preconditions for this are emerging very 
slowly, if at all. (2014: 56) 
However, Belarus’s behaviour during the crisis in Ukraine raises doubts about the 
validity of this conclusion. The Belarusian authorities demonstrated a great deal 
of geopolitical manoeuvre and flexibility in their reaction to the tensions between 
Russia and Ukraine, despite the country’s alliance commitments (in the Union 
State of Belarus and Russia, the EEU and CSTO) and its asymmetrical dependence 
on Moscow. Belarus’s actual behaviour went completely against the conventional 
expectations for a small state under similar structural conditions, which would be 
bandwagoning with the stronger neighbour. It also went against Russia’s publicly 
expressed interests. Perhaps, the most obvious example being Minsk’s refusal to 
host a Russian airbase (Preiherman, 2015). 
Also, amidst numerous contradictory and blurry position statements of the 
Belarusian government on the Ukraine crisis three elements of the Belarusian 
position became salient and actually opposite to that of Russia: 
 
1. Belarus will cooperate with any Ukrainian government; 
2. Belarus supports Ukraine’s territorial integrity; 
3. Any federalisation will create chaos in Ukraine (Preiherman, 2014). 
 
The mixture of what might seem as inconsistent and contradictory decisions/ 
actions in relation to the Ukraine crisis and in the bilateral relations with Russia 
also reveals the hedging logic, where Minsk pursues two aims simultaneously. On 
the one hand, it tries to avoid becoming a bandwagoning subject of Russian 
policies. And at the very same time it makes sure that its foreign policy moves do 
not cross what Moscow might see as a ‘red line’. This explains Belarus’s decision 
to vote in Russia’s favour at the UN General Assembly vote on the Crimea in 
March 2014. Importantly, having sided with Russia on that vote, the Belarusian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs instructed the national Cartography Service to keep the 
Crimea as part of Ukraine on their maps (Shraibman, 2015). 
Another manifestation of Belarus’s independent line on the crisis in Ukraine is 
the so-called ‘Minsk negotiations platform’, e.g. the status of the neutral ground 
where the Minsk-I and Minsk-II accords were negotiated and where the OSCE 
Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine regularly convenes. The platform itself 
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became a hedging instrument against a possibility of being involuntarily involved 
in the military-political escalation between Russia and the West. 
Finally, we can check this foreign policy line against Tessman’s mechanism for 
identifying strategic hedging behaviour. 
Filter One. Belarus faces a highly complicated challenge of having to diversify 
its economic relations and, thus, improve its ability to cope without the public 
goods and subsidies normally provided by Russia. Three things seem crucial here: 
discounted gas and oil, access to the Russian market, and access to financial 
credits from Russia. Given the structure of Belarus’s economy and the country’s 
unstable relations with the West, this is a particularly complicated task. 
Nonetheless, the government has proclaimed the 30-30-30 strategy with a view 
to diversifying its economic relations: a third of the exports should go to Russia, 
another third to the EU and yet another 30% to the rest of the world (Naviny.by, 
2016). It also conducts negotiations with the IMF and China in order to get loans 
from their rather than from Russia or Russian-led institutions. Energy resources 
are more difficult to diversify, even though Minsk makes attempts to try deliveries 
from other countries, for example, Azerbaijan (Sputnik.by, 2017). 
Military preparations are even more difficult to track. However, according to 
the author’s interviews, contingency planning in case of Russia’s military 
aggression has become a common, even though hidden, practice in the 
Belarusian army (Anonymous interviews, 2015–2016). 
Filter Two. According to most analysts and insiders, the military realm is the 
‘sacred cow’ of Belarus-Russia relations (Ibid). In other, words, this is where 
Russia’s ‘red lines’ are most clearly visible. Therefore, Belarus has never even 
spoken about a possibility of a security alliance with partners other than Russia 
(which would be an example of external balancing). On the contrary, Belarus has 
always exercised enmeshment (entangling Russia in integration projects, 
including the CSTO, which is another typical element of strategic hedging, in 
order to increase its leverage over Moscow’s security thinking and getting access 
to some elements of its defence planning. 
Filter Three. Given the nature of the Belarusian political regime, any repetitive 
foreign policy decisions are funded and coordinated at the highest level of 
government. In a recent press-conference President Alyaksandr Lukashenka 
explicitly articulated this point (Lukashenka, 2017). 
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Thus, Belarus’s Russia policy does pass Tessman’s strategic hedging test and 
presents an interesting case for further research. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Discussions about Belarus’s foreign and domestic politics usually see more 
simplifications than discussions about any other country in the ‘shared 
neighbourhood’ between the EU and Russia. Presumably, this results from the 
exaggerated reference to the popular notion of the ‘last dictatorship of Europe’ 
that is typical of policy and even academic discussions. For this reason, it is worth 
studying the case of Belarus in more detail. 
Neoclassical realism as an analytical framework allows combining system- and 
actor-level variables, a combination of which normally misses from the analysis of 
the foreign policies of small states that sit between geopolitical powerful centres, 
while the application of the concept of strategic hedging offers a new research 
avenue that can highlight the fundamental thinking of policy-makers that other 
approaches fail to grasp. 
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